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John A. Gavit, Hammond, age 76. Died October 13, 1937.
Thomas J. Wilson, former Circuit Court judge, Corydon, age 74.
Died November 13, 1937.
Franklin McCray, a charter member of the Indiana Bar Ass6ciation
and former criminal court judge, Indianapolis, age 83. Died Novem-
ber 20, 1937.
William S. McMaster, former Superior Court judge, Indianapolis,
age 60. Died October 1937.
Clarence W. Dearth, former Circuit Court judge, Muncie, age 65.
Died November 15, 1937.
Benjamin F. Harness, former Circuit Court judge, Kokomo, age 89,
died October 10, 1937.
Russel McCormack, Indianapolis, age 46. Died 1937.
Henry T. Hardin, Evansville, age 45. Died November 8, 1937.
James T. Walker, Evansville, age 87. Died November 22, 1937.
Charles Herbert Stuart, Lafayette, age 59. Died November 12,
1937.
RECENT CASE NOTES
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-CAUSATION IN SUNSTROKE CASEs-Decedent, an
employee of defendant, died of sunstroke while working in defendant's
cemetery, and while occupied in mowing the grass. This proceeding involves
an appeal from an order of the Industrial Board denying complainant
compensation under the Indiana Workman's Compensation Act., Held-The
death of deceased is not compensable as resulting from injury arising out
of and in the course of the employment in the absence of evidence that the
lawn mower or condition of the grass produced any unusual amount of
heat and exposure, or that the employee was subjected to any condition dif-
ferent from that of the other employees. 2
1 There was an additional fact present in the case: the decedent had
suffered from the intense heat earlier in the day while serving his own
purposes and before entering into the performance of his duties for defendant.
It is submitted that this should not be considered an influential factor in the
decision rendered in that: (1) it was apparently not deemed of controlling
importance by the court; (2) as. a basis for refusal of relief, it would tend
to conflict with the previously established principle that the employment need
not be the sole cause of the death, but it is sufficient if it is a contributing
cause: Miami Coal Co. v. Luce (1921), 76 Ind. App. 245, 131 N. E. 824.
For analagous causative difficulties, see: Puritan Bed Springs Company v.
Wolfe (1918), 68 Ind. App. 330, 120 N. E. 417 (workman rendered sus-
ceptible to injury by pre-existing hernia condition); Indian Creek Coal and
Mining Company v. Calvert (1918), 68 Ind. App. 474, 119 N. E. 519, 120
N. E. 709 (pre-existing disease of the aorta) ; Owens v. McWilliams (1926),
85 Ind. App. 92, 152 N. E. 841 (pre-existing heart disease).
2Thompson v. Masonic Cemetery Association (Ind. App., 1936), -,
5 N. E. (2d) 145. There is no difficulty here as to whether the injury is an
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The term 'arising out of the employment' 3 has repeatedly been interpreted
to require but proof of a causal relation between the employment and the
resulting injury.4 By the overwhelming weight of authority the court-made
test of this relationship in those cases of injury from the elements and more
specifically in those involving sunstroke is whether the employee is by reason
of his work exposed to a greater risk of harm than that undergone by the
general public.5 If by reason of his employment the danger of injury to his
person is enhanced and the hazard is greater than that to which the public
generally is subjected, he is then, and then only, entitled to compensation.
It is submitted that as a test of employer responsibility this is objectionable.
Obviously, it proves to be a most elusive and deceptive concept. Who is
to be considered the general public? As a basis of comparison are we
going to choose outdoor workers or indoor workers, or does our concept
refer to those who do not work at all? Again, are we referring to the
ordinary prudent man, or to the energetic person, or to' those who are
"accident," or whether it happened "in the course of" the employment. As
to the former, see: Townsend and Freeman Co. v. Taggart (1924), 81 Ind.
App. 610, 144 N. E. 556. As to the latter see: Granite, Sand, and Gravel
Co. v. Willoughby ( ), 70 Ind. App. 112, 123 N. E. 194.
3Burns, 1933, Section 40-1701 (d). As to the term "employment," it
has been said: "The original causative factor [in Workman's Compensation
cases] is not a single definite thing but an exceedingly complex, variable,
and undefined collection of substances, activities and conditions, making up
what is termed the 'employment' of the injured man. It includes not only
buildings, machines, instrumentalities, and employees, all under the control
of the employer, but also the peculiar environment within which the employee
is placed. It thus comprehends not only the activities and physical properties
of third persons but even the uncontrollable forces of nature. In compensa-
tion law an injury may be said to arise out of the employment, if such
employment, in its conditions, its relationships, or its environment in some
way causes or occasions the accident from which the injury of the employee
arises. Brown, 'Arising Out of And in the Course of the Employment' in
Workmen's Compensation Laws. Part III, 8 Wis. L. Rev. 134, 133.
4The leading American decision hereon is McNicol's Case (1913), 215
Mass. 497, 102 N. E. 697, L. R. A. 1916 A. 306. In accord: United Paperboard
Co. v. Lewis (1917), 65 Ind. App. 356, 117 N. E. 276; Smith v. Leslie (1926),
85 Ind App. 186, 151 N. E. 17.
5Townsend and Freeman Co. v. Taggart (1924), 81 Ind. App. 610, 144
N. E. 556; In re Harraden (1917), 66 Ind. App. 298, 118 N. E. 142; Skelly
Oil Co. v. State Industrial Commission (1923), 91 Okla. 194, 216 P. 933; Kinsey
Heating and Plumbing Co. v. House (1931), 152 Okla. 200, 4 P. (2d) 59;
Larke v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. (1916), 90 Conn. 303,
97 A. 320, L. R. A. 1916 E, 584, 12 N. C. C. A. 308; Slanina v. Industrial
Commission (1927), 117 Ohio 329, 158 N. E. 829; Globe Indemnity Co. v.
McKindre (1928), 39 Ga. App. 58, 146 S. E. 46; Texas Employer's Ins.
Association -. Moore (1925), 279 S. W. 516 (Tex. Civ. App.); New Amster-
'dam Casualty Co. v. Humphrey (1931), 47 F. (2d) 57, 30 N. C. C. A. 405;
Slocum v. Jolley (1927), 153 Md. 343, 138 A. 244; Davies v. Gillespie (1911),
105 L. T. 494; Andrew v. Failsworth (1904), 90 L. T. 611. The phrase
"other persons in the same locality" is frequently substituted for the term
"general public": Consumers' Company v. Industrial Commission of Ill.
(1926), 324 I1. 152, 154 N. E. 423, 53 A. L. R. 1079; Deckard v. Trustees
of Indiana University (1930), 92 Ind. App. 192, 172 N. E. 547. Similarly,
with the phrase "other persons in the community": Walsh v. River Spinning
Co. (1918), 41 R. I. 490, 103 A. 1025, 13 A. L. R. 956; Kripplaben v. Green-
spon's Sons Iron and Steel Co. (Mo. App. 1932), 50 S. W, (2d) 752.
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dilatory and carefree? Or is it the duty of the jurist to apply an abstract
standard that is a conglomeration of these varying and discordant factors?
The very statement of the possible ramifications of the test furnishes the
answer of condemnation.6 Perhaps it is because of this that the practitioner
is faced with the realization of his inability to rationalize in any conceivable
manner the various conflicting and contradictory holdings even though based
upon the same or analogous factual situations.
7
In view of these very patent difficulties in the remedial application of
the test, the courts have undertaken at various times to obtain a more
definite standard of responsibility. The instant case might be taken as
illustrative of one possible solution of the problem. In rendering its decision,
the appellate tribunal emphasized the absence of evidence to show that the
decedent was subjected to any greater risk than were other employees.
Admittedly this as a test of causal relation is laid down in the alternative,
in connection with language that partakes of the usual standard hereinbefore
referred to, and yet the decision as a whole, when considered in the light
of the case of Cunninghaim v. Warner Gear Company,
8 is beleived to
be indicative of a recent tendency on the part of the Indiana court to divest
the test of its present generalities. In the Cunninghaim case the court held
that "the heat eminating from the pots at which the decedent was working
exposed him to a hazard beyond that of the other employees; therefore, the
resulting death from heat prostration will be regarded as due to an accident
arising out of the employment."
9  Although the attempt to formulate a
more positive standard of responsibility is to be commended, it is felt that
the test proposed by the court should be rejected.1O This conclusoin is
reached because it will lead to a further delimitation of the field of com-
pensable injuries in that it results in the judicial construction of the term
"arising out of the employment" to refer solely to the hazards that surround
the performance of the employee's specific duties, over and above those to
which he and his fellow servants are subjected by reason of their occupation.
Another effort to render less equivocal the test of causal relation seems
traceable to the English decision of Warner v. Couchman.
1 1  There the
6The standard is criticized in Brown, 'Arising Out of And in the Course
of the Employment' in Workmen's Compensation Laws-Part III-S Wisc.
L. Rev. 134, 140-141.
7 See Brown, supra, page 141, note (19).
8 (Ind. App., 1935), 198 N. E. 808.
OThe court cites five cases as sustaining the proposition thus laid down.
Of these, two, Townsend and Freeman Co. v. Taggart, supra, note (5) and
Walsh v. River Spinning Co., supra, note (5), adopt the majority test and
hence are flatly contra; and two of the others, Chapman Price Steel Co. v.
Bertels (1931), 92 Ind. App. 634, 177 N. E. 76, and United Paperboard Co. v.
Lewis, supra, note (4), fail to specify the test of causative relation used.
The fifth State ex rel. Rau v. District Court (1917), 138 Minn. 250, 164 N. W.
916, states as the proper test: "Was the decedent exposed to something
more than the normal risk to which men in general engaged in manual
labor upon th streets are subjected in hot weather?" (N. E., p. 917).
10 It was expressly rejected in Ahern v. Spier (1918), 93 Conn. 151, 105
A. 340. Of course, it is inferentially denied by all courts upholding the
majority test of causal relation.
11 (1911), 103 L. T. 693. (F. Moulton, L. J., dissenting.)
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court laid down a standard of responsibility predicated upon a showing of a
risk greater than that to which the generality of laborers is subjected. Al-
though this theory has had some American following,1 2 it is usually repudiated
by modern authority, the courts saying that it is not necessary that the
risk be peculiar to the particular employment.13 It, too, should be rejected
in that it further restricts employer liability, and goes against the grain of
judicial opinion which has enunciated the principle of liberal construction
of the requirements of the Workmen's Compensation Acts.14
It is submitted, however, with due deference to the weight of authority,
that there is a way out of the quandary in which we are placed. It lies
in the substitution of the reasonable man concept for that of the general
public. Such a change could be accomplished without legislative interference;
and since the judicial content of that concept has been determined by past
decisions, it would provide a workable basis of comparison from which to
judge causative relation. Our test would then be whether the employee has
because of his work been subjected to a risk to which, if he were not
employed at all,' 5 he, as a reasonable man, would not have exposed
himself.16
In conclusion it should be noted that there is a danger in the unqualified
application to Workmen Compensation cases of either the majority test or
the one herein proposed. Mere possibility that the injured workman would
have otherwise been subjected to the same risk as his employment carries
is insufficient.1 7  It must appear, before relief can be denied, that as a
12State ex rel. Rau v. District Court, supra, note (9) ; State ex rel.
Nelson v. District Court (1917), 138 Minn. 260, 164 N. W. 917, L. R. A.
1918 F 921; Daugherty's Case (1921), 238 Mass. 456, 131 N. E. 167, 16
A. L. R. 1036; Lewis v. Industrial Commission of Wis. (1922), 178 Wis.
449, 190 N. W. 101, 25 A. L. R. 139 (strong dissent).
13 Larke v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. (1916), 90 Conn. 303,
97 A. 320, L. R. A. 1916 E. 584; Eagle River Building and Supply Co. v.
Peck (1929), 199 Wis. 192, 225 N. W. 690, overruling by implication the
Lewis case, supra, note (12); Nikkiczuk v. McArthur (1916), 9 Alberta L. R.
503, 28 Doam. L. R. 279; Consolidated Pipe Line Co. v. Mahon (1931), 3 P.
(2d) 844, 152 Okla. 72; Ahern v. Spier, supra, note (10). Again, this standard
is by implication repudiated by those cases adopting the majority test.
14The policy of liberal construction is laid down in Holland-St. Louis
Sugar Co. v. Shraluka (1917), 64 Ind. App. 545, 116 N. E. 330; Stacey
Brothers Gas Construction Co. v. Massey (1931), 92 Ind. App. 348, 175 N. E.
368, and the cases cited therein.
15 The phrase "if not employed at all" is included because it is a logical
result of the cases noticed in footnote (13).
106The word order of the test is, for convenience, changed from that
usually found in statements of the present majority standard. Again, when
this is done it is more apparent that what we are applying is a form of the
"but for" test so well known to the law of causation.
17 The writer has found no compensation cases expressly establishing this
principle. It has, however, been often enunciated in the determination of
causative relation in negligence cases: See Davis v. Garrett (1830), 6 Bing.
716; Reynolds v. Texas and P. R. Co. (1885), 37 La. Ann. 694; Harper,
The Law of Tort, Section 109, p. 255. "We are in compensation cases apply-
ing but a modified form of the 'but for' test used by the courts in the above
cited decisions." Harper, supra, Chap. 11.
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"practical certainty" he would have been so exposed.18 As illustrative,
let us take the instant case. The death of decedent should have been com-
pensable unless it appeared to be certain that even though he had not been
employed, he, as a reasonable man, would still have been exposed to the
rays of the sun for hours at a time and engaged in similar muscular activity.
1 9
While no compensation case has been found expressly recognizing this fact,
it is an accepted principle of causation, and is as applicable and socially
desirable in this field of the law as in those involving tortious acts.
C. D. L
CORPORATIONS-RATIFICATION OF UNAUTHORIZED AcTS--IMPuTAToN OF
NoTIcE.-Defendant, a plumbing contractor, performed services for McKnight,
who was a stockholder and director of the plaintiff corporation, and who
for fourteen years had been in charge of the retail store operated by the
corporation. Defendant and McKnight entered into a contract whereby
defendant was to purchase supplies from the corporation and these were to
be set off against McKnight's indebtedness to defendant. The purchases
extended over a period of several years, during which time defendant never
received a bill from the corporation, but regular invoices were sent. This
action was to recover for the goods sold and delivered. Defendant counter-
claimed, alleging that the corporation was bound by the contract made by
McKnight. Held, by acquiescing in the agreement, the corporation had
ratified it.1
The principal question involved in a discussion of this case is whether
the agreement was ratified by the corporation. It is true that an agreement
can be ratified by acquiescence. 2  However, ratification by acquiescence
requires that the one ratifying have notice of the agreement.
3 In the present
case it was not shown that anyone connected with the corporation, except
McKnight and possibly those working under him, had any actual knowledge
of the agreement. How, then, could the corporation have notice of the agree-
ment? In the principal case, the court held that directors of a corporation
18 Harper, supra, Sec. 109, p. 255.
19 Physical exertion, as well as the heat from the sun, is a contributing
cause of sunstroke. Draper, Legal Medicine, p. 461.
1 Fayette Lumber Co. v. Faught (Ind. App., 1937), 5 N. E. (2d) 132.
2 Seymour Improvement Co. v. Viking Sprinkler Co. (1927), 87 Ind. App.
179, 161 N. E. 389; Hoosier Lumber Co. v. Spear (1934), 99 Ind. App. 532,
189 N. E. 633; National Life Ins. Co. v. Headrick (1916), 63 Ind. App. 54,
112 N. E. 559; American Quarries Co. v. Lay (1905), 37 Ind. App. 386, 73
N. E. 608; Washburn-Crosby Mill Co. v. Brown (1913), 56 Ind. App. 104,
104 N. E. 997; Indiana Union Traction Co. v. Scribner (1910), 47 Ind. App.
621, 93 N. E. 1014; Outing Kumfy-Kab Co. v. Ivey (1920), 74 Ind. App. 286,
125 N. E. 234.
3 National Life Ins. Co. v. Headrick (1916), 63 Ind. App. 54, 112 N. E.
559; Indiana Union Traction Co. v. Scribner (1910), 47 Ind. App. 621, 93
N. E. 1014; Outing Kumfy-Kab Co. v. Ivey (1920), 74 Ind. App. 286, 125
N. E. 234; Crowder v. Reed (1881), 80 Ind. 1; Crumpacker v. Jeffry (1916),
63 Ind. App. 621, 115 N. E. 62; Kline v. Indiana Trust Co. (1920), 74- Ind.
App. 351, 125 N. E. 434.
